Pertempuran
Surabaya merupakan peristiwa sejarah perang antara pihak tentara
Indonesia dan pasukan Belanda. Peristiwa besar ini terjadi pada tanggal
10 November 1945 di kota Surabaya, Jawa Timur. Pertempuran ini adalah
perang pertama pasukan Indonesia dengan pasukan asing setelah Proklamasi
Kemerdekaan Indonesia dan satu pertempuran terbesar dan terberat dalam
sejarah Revolusi Nasional Indonesia yang menjadi simbol nasional atas
perlawanan Indonesia terhadap kolonialisme.
Kronologi penyebab peristiwa
Kedatangan Tentara Jepang ke Indonesia
Tanggal
1 Maret 1942, tentara Jepang mendarat di Pulau Jawa, dan tujuh hari
kemudian tanggal 8 Maret 1945, pemerintah kolonial Belanda menyerah
tanpa syarat kepada Jepang berdasarkan perjanjian Kalidjati. Setelah
penyerahan tanpa syarat tesebut, Indonesia secara resmi diduduki oleh
Jepang.
Proklamasi Kemerdekaan Indonesia
Tiga
tahun kemudian, Jepang menyerah tanpa syarat kepada sekutu setelah
dijatuhkannya bom atom (oleh Amerika Serikat) di Hiroshima dan Nagasaki.
Peristiwa itu terjadi pada bulan Agustus 1945. Dalam kekosongan
kekuasaan asing tersebut, Soekarno kemudian memproklamirkan kemerdekaan
Indonesia pada 17 Agustus 1945.
Kedatangan Tentara Inggris & Belanda
Setelah
kekalahan pihak Jepang, rakyat dan pejuang Indonesia berupaya melucuti
senjata para tentara Jepang. Maka timbullah pertempuran-pertempuran yang
memakan korban di banyak daerah. Ketika gerakan untuk melucuti pasukan
Jepang sedang berkobar, tanggal 15 September 1945, tentara Inggris
mendarat di Jakarta, kemudian mendarat di Surabaya pada 25 Oktober 1945.
Tentara Inggris datang ke Indonesia tergabung dalam AFNEI (Allied
Forces Netherlands East Indies) atas keputusan dan atas nama Blok
Sekutu, dengan tugas untuk melucuti tentara Jepang, membebaskan para
tawanan perang yang ditahan Jepang, serta memulangkan tentara Jepang ke
negerinya. Namun selain itu tentara Inggris yang datang juga membawa
misi mengembalikan Indonesia kepada administrasi pemerintahan Belanda
sebagai negeri jajahan Hindia Belanda. NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil
Administration) ikut membonceng bersama rombongan tentara Inggris untuk
tujuan tersebut. Hal ini memicu gejolak rakyat Indonesia dan memunculkan
pergerakan perlawanan rakyat Indonesia di mana-mana melawan tentara
AFNEI dan pemerintahan NICA.
Insiden di Hotel Yamato, Tunjungan, Surabaya
Setelah
munculnya maklumat pemerintah Indonesia tanggal 31 Agustus 1945 yang
menetapkan bahwa mulai 1 September 1945 bendera nasional Sang Saka Merah
Putih dikibarkan terus di seluruh wilayah Indonesia, gerakan pengibaran
bendera tersebut makin meluas ke segenap pelosok kota Surabaya. Klimaks
gerakan pengibaran bendera di Surabaya terjadi pada insiden perobekan
bendera di Yamato Hoteru / Hotel Yamato (bernama Oranje Hotel atau Hotel
Oranye pada zaman kolonial, sekarang bernama Hotel Majapahit) di Jl.
Tunjungan no. 65 Surabaya.
Sekelompok
orang Belanda di bawah pimpinan Mr. W.V.Ch Ploegman pada sore hari
tanggal 18 September 1945, tepatnya pukul 21.00, mengibarkan bendera
Belanda (Merah-Putih-Biru), tanpa persetujuan Pemerintah RI Daerah
Surabaya, di tiang pada tingkat teratas Hotel Yamato, sisi sebelah
utara. Keesokan harinya para pemuda Surabaya melihatnya dan menjadi
marah karena mereka menganggap Belanda telah menghina kedaulatan
Indonesia, hendak mengembalikan kekuasan kembali di Indonesia, dan
melecehkan gerakan pengibaran bendera Merah Putih yang sedang
berlangsung di Surabaya.
Tak
lama setelah mengumpulnya massa di Hotel Yamato, Residen Sudirman,
pejuang dan diplomat yang saat itu menjabat sebagai Wakil Residen (Fuku
Syuco Gunseikan) yang masih diakui pemerintah Dai Nippon Surabaya Syu,
sekaligus sebagai Residen Daerah Surabaya Pemerintah RI, datang melewati
kerumunan massa lalu masuk ke hotel Yamato dikawal Sidik dan Hariyono.
Sebagai perwakilan RI dia berunding dengan Mr. Ploegman dan
kawan-kawannya dan meminta agar bendera Belanda segera diturunkan dari
gedung Hotel Yamato. Dalam perundingan ini Ploegman menolak untuk
menurunkan bendera Belanda dan menolak untuk mengakui kedaulatan
Indonesia. Perundingan berlangsung memanas, Ploegman mengeluarkan
pistol, dan terjadilah perkelahian dalam ruang perundingan. Ploegman
tewas dicekik oleh Sidik, yang kemudian juga tewas oleh tentara Belanda
yang berjaga-jaga dan mendengar letusan pistol Ploegman, sementara
Sudirman dan Hariyono melarikan diri ke luar Hotel Yamato. Sebagian
pemuda berebut naik ke atas hotel untuk menurunkan bendera Belanda.
Hariyono yang semula bersama Sudirman kembali ke dalam hotel dan
terlibat dalam pemanjatan tiang bendera dan bersama Kusno Wibowo
berhasil menurunkan bendera Belanda, merobek bagian birunya, dan
mengereknya ke puncak tiang bendera kembali sebagai bendera Merah Putih.
Setelah
insiden di Hotel Yamato tersebut, pada tanggal 27 Oktober 1945
meletuslah pertempuran pertama antara Indonesia melawan tentara Inggris .
Serangan-serangan kecil tersebut di kemudian hari berubah menjadi
serangan umum yang banyak memakan korban jiwa di kedua belah pihak
Indonesia dan Inggris, sebelum akhirnya Jenderal D.C. Hawthorn meminta
bantuan Presiden Sukarno untuk meredakan situasi.
Kematian Brigadir Jenderal Mallaby
Setelah
gencatan senjata antara pihak Indonesia dan pihak tentara Inggris
ditandatangani tanggal 29 Oktober 1945, keadaan berangsur-angsur mereda.
Walaupun begitu tetap saja terjadi bentrokan-bentrokan bersenjata
antara rakyat dan tentara Inggris di Surabaya. Bentrokan-bentrokan
bersenjata di Surabaya tersebut memuncak dengan terbunuhnya Brigadir
Jenderal Mallaby, (pimpinan tentara Inggris untuk Jawa Timur), pada 30
Oktober 1945 sekitar pukul 20.30. Mobil Buick yang ditumpangi Brigadir
Jenderal Mallaby berpapasan dengan sekelompok milisi Indonesia ketika
akan melewati Jembatan Merah. Kesalahpahaman menyebabkan terjadinya
tembak menembak yang berakhir dengan tewasnya Brigadir Jenderal Mallaby
oleh tembakan pistol seorang pemuda Indonesia yang sampai sekarang tak
diketahui identitasnya, dan terbakarnya mobil tersebut terkena ledakan
granat yang menyebabkan jenazah Mallaby sulit dikenali. Kematian Mallaby
ini menyebabkan pihak Inggris marah kepada pihak Indonesia dan
berakibat pada keputusan pengganti Mallaby, Mayor Jenderal E.C. Mansergh
untuk mengeluarkan ultimatum 10 November 1945 untuk meminta pihak
Indonesia menyerahkan persenjataan dan menghentikan perlawanan pada
tentara AFNEI dan administrasi NICA.
Perdebatan tentang pihak penyebab baku tembak
Tom
Driberg, seorang Anggota Parlemen Inggris dari Partai Buruh Inggris
(Labour Party). Pada 20 Februari 1946, dalam perdebatan di Parlemen
Inggris (House of Commons) meragukan bahwa baku tembak ini dimulai oleh
pasukan pihak Indonesia. Dia menyampaikan bahwa peristiwa baku tembak
ini disinyalir kuat timbul karena kesalahpahaman 20 anggota pasukan
India pimpinan Mallaby yang memulai baku tembak tersebut tidak
mengetahui bahwa gencatan senjata sedang berlaku karena mereka terputus
dari kontak dan telekomunikasi. Berikut kutipan dari Tom Driberg:
“…
Sekitar 20 orang (serdadu) India (milik Inggris), di sebuah bangunan di
sisi lain alun-alun, telah terputus dari komunikasi lewat telepon dan
tidak tahu tentang gencatan senjata. Mereka menembak secara sporadis
pada massa (Indonesia). Brigadir Mallaby keluar dari diskusi (gencatan
senjata), berjalan lurus ke arah kerumunan, dengan keberanian besar, dan
berteriak kepada serdadu India untuk menghentikan tembakan. Mereka
patuh kepadanya. Mungkin setengah jam kemudian, massa di alun-alun
menjadi bergolak lagi. Brigadir Mallaby, pada titik tertentu dalam
diskusi, memerintahkan serdadu India untuk menembak lagi. Mereka
melepaskan tembakan dengan dua senapan Bren dan massa bubar dan lari
untuk berlindung; kemudian pecah pertempuran lagi dengan sungguh gencar.
Jelas bahwa ketika Brigadir Mallaby memberi perintah untuk membuka
tembakan lagi, perundingan gencatan senjata sebenarnya telah pecah,
setidaknya secara lokal. Dua puluh menit sampai setengah jam setelah
itu, ia (Mallaby) sayangnya tewas dalam mobilnya-meskipun (kita) tidak
benar-benar yakin apakah ia dibunuh oleh orang Indonesia yang mendekati
mobilnya; yang meledak bersamaan dengan serangan terhadap dirinya
(Mallaby).
Saya
pikir ini tidak dapat dituduh sebagai pembunuhan licik… karena
informasi saya dapat secepatnya dari saksi mata, yaitu seorang perwira
Inggris yang benar-benar ada di tempat kejadian pada saat itu, yang niat
jujurnya saya tak punya alasan untuk pertanyakan … “
Ultimatum 10 November 1945
Setelah
terbunuhnya Brigadir Jenderal Mallaby, penggantinya, Mayor Jenderal
Mansergh mengeluarkan ultimatum yang menyebutkan bahwa semua pimpinan
dan orang Indonesia yang bersenjata harus melapor dan meletakkan
senjatanya di tempat yang ditentukan dan menyerahkan diri dengan
mengangkat tangan di atas. Batas ultimatum adalah jam 6.00 pagi tanggal
10 November 1945.
Ultimatum
tersebut kemudian dianggap sebagai penghinaan bagi para pejuang dan
rakyat yang telah membentuk banyak badan-badan perjuangan / milisi.
Ultimatum tersebut ditolak oleh pihak Indonesia dengan alasan bahwa
Republik Indonesia waktu itu sudah berdiri, dan Tentara Keamanan Rakyat
(TKR) juga telah dibentuk sebagai pasukan negara. Selain itu, banyak
organisasi perjuangan bersenjata yang telah dibentuk masyarakat,
termasuk di kalangan pemuda, mahasiswa dan pelajar yang menentang
masuknya kembali pemerintahan Belanda yang memboncengi kehadiran tentara
Inggris di Indonesia.
Pada
10 November pagi, tentara Inggris mulai melancarkan serangan berskala
besar, yang diawali dengan bom udara ke gedung-gedung pemerintahan
Surabaya, dan kemudian mengerahkan sekitar 30.000 infanteri, sejumlah
pesawat terbang, tank, dan kapal perang.
Berbagai
bagian kota Surabaya dibombardir dan ditembak dengan meriam dari laut
dan darat. Perlawanan pasukan dan milisi Indonesia kemudian berkobar di
seluruh kota, dengan bantuan yang aktif dari penduduk. Terlibatnya
penduduk dalam pertempuran ini mengakibatkan ribuan penduduk sipil jatuh
menjadi korban dalam serangan tersebut, baik meninggal mupun terluka.
Di
luar dugaan pihak Inggris yang menduga bahwa perlawanan di Surabaya
bisa ditaklukkan dalam tempo tiga hari, para tokoh masyarakat seperti
pelopor muda Bung Tomo yang berpengaruh besar di masyarakat terus
menggerakkan semangat perlawanan pemuda-pemuda Surabaya sehingga
perlawanan terus berlanjut di tengah serangan skala besar Inggris.
Tokoh-tokoh agama yang terdiri dari kalangan ulama serta kyai-kyai
pondok Jawa seperti KH. Hasyim Asy’ari, KH. Wahab Hasbullah serta
kyai-kyai pesantren lainnya juga mengerahkan santri-santri mereka dan
masyarakat sipil sebagai milisi perlawanan (pada waktu itu masyarakat
tidak begitu patuh kepada pemerintahan tetapi mereka lebih patuh dan
taat kepada para kyai) shingga perlawanan pihak Indonesia berlangsung
lama, dari hari ke hari, hingga dari minggu ke minggu lainnya.
Perlawanan rakyat yang pada awalnya dilakukan secara spontan dan tidak
terkoordinasi, makin hari makin teratur. Pertempuran skala besar ini
mencapai waktu sampai tiga minggu, sebelum seluruh kota Surabaya
akhirnya jatuh di tangan pihak Inggris.
Setidaknya
6,000 pejuang dari pihak Indonesia tewas dan 200,000 rakyat sipil
mengungsi dari Surabaya. [2]. Korban dari pasukan Inggris dan India
kira-kira sejumlah 600. Pertempuran berdarah di Surabaya yang memakan
ribuan korban jiwa tersebut telah menggerakkan perlawanan rakyat di
seluruh Indonesia untuk mengusir penjajah dan mempertahankan
kemerdekaan. Banyaknya pejuang yang gugur dan rakyat sipil yang menjadi
korban pada hari 10 November ini kemudian dikenang sebagai Hari Pahlawan
oleh Republik Indonesia hingga sekarang.
Tewasnya Brigadir Jenderal Mallaby
Setelah disepakati truce (gencatan senjata) tanggal 30 Oktober 1945,
pimpinan sipil dan militer pihak Indonesia, serta pimpinan militer
Inggris bersama-sama keliling kota dengan iring-iringan mobil, untuk
menyebarluaskan kesepakatan tersebut. Dari 8 pos pertahanan Inggris, 6
di antaranya tidak ada masalah, hanya di dua tempat, yakni di Gedung Lindeteves dan Gedung Internatio yang masih ada permasalahan/tembak-menembak.
Setelah berhasil mengatasi kesulitan di Gedung Lindeteves, rombongan Indonesia-Inggris segera menuju Gedung Internatio,
pos pertahanan Inggris terakhir yang bermasalah. Ketika rombongan tiba
di lokasi tersebut, nampak bahwa gedung tersebut dikepung oleh ratusan
pemuda. Setelah meliwati Jembatan Merah, tujuh kendaraan memasuki area
dan berhenti di depan gedung. Para pemimpin Indonesia segera ke luar
kendaraan dan meneriakkan kepada massa, supaya menghentikan
tembak-menembak.
Kapten Shaw,
Mohammad Mangundiprojo dan T.D. Kundan ditugaskan masuk ke gedung untuk
menyampaikan kepada tentara Inggris yang bertahan di dalam gedung,
hasil perundingan antara Inggris dengan Indonesia. Mallaby ada di dalam
mobil yang diparkir di depan Gedung Internatio. Beberapa saat setelah
rombongan masuk, terlihat T.D. Kundan bergegas keluar dari gedung, dan
tak lama kemudian, terdengar bunyi tembakan dari arah gedung. Tembakan
ini langsung dibalas oleh pihak Indonesia. Tembak-menembak berlangsung
sekitar dua jam. Setelah tembak-menembak dapat dihentikan, terlihat
mobil Mallaby hancur dan Mallaby sendiri ditemukan telah tewas.
Ada dua kejadian pada tanggal 30 Oktober 1945,
yang pada waktu itu dilemparkan oleh Inggris ke pihak Indonesia,
sebagai yang bertanggung jawab, dan kemudian dijadikan alasan Mansergh
untuk “menghukum para ekstremis” dengan mengeluarkan ultimatum tanggal 9 November 1945:
- Orang-orang Indonesia memulai penembakan, dan dengan demikian telah melanggar gencatan senjata (truce),
- Orang-orang Indonesia membunuh Brigadier Mallaby.
Tewasnya
Mallaby memang sangat kontroversial, tetapi mengenai siapa yang memulai
menembak, di kemudian hari cukup jelas. Kesaksian tersebut justru
datangnya dari pihak Inggris. Ini berdasarkan keterangan beberapa
perwira Inggris yang diberikan kepada beberapa pihak.
Yang paling menarik adalah yang disampaikan kepada Tom Driberg, seorang Anggota Parlemen Inggris dari Partai Buruh (Labour). Pada 20 Februari 1946, dalam perdebatan di Parlemen (House of Commons) Tom Driberg, menyampaikan:
“….. some of the press reports from Indonesia have been entirely responsible. In particular, I have learned from officers who have recently returned that some of the stories which have been told, not only in the newspaper, but, I am sorry to say, from the Government Front Bench in his House, have been very far from accurate and have innecessarily imparted prejudice and concerns the lamented death of Brigadier Mallaby. That was announced to us as a foul murder, and we accepted it as such. I have learned from officers who were present when it happened the exact details and it is perfectly clear that Brigadier Mallaby was not murdered but was honourably killed in action……. The incident was somewhat confused –as such incidents are- but it took place in and near Union Square in Surabaya. There had been discussions about a truce earlier in the day. A large crowd of Indonesians –a mob if you like- had gathered in the square and were in a rather excited state.
About 20 Indians, in a building on the other side of the square, had been cut off from telephonic communication and did not know about the truce. They were firing sporadically on the mob. Brigadier Mallaby came out from the discussions, walked straight into the crowd, with great courage, and shouted to the Indians to cease fire. They obeyed him. Possibly half an hour later, the mob in the square became turbulent again. Brigadier Mallaby, at a certain point in the proceedings, ordered the Indians to open fire again. They opened fire with two Bren Guns and the mob dispersed and went to cover; then fighting broke out again in good earnest. It is apparent that when Brigadier Mallaby gave the order to open fire again, the truce was in fact broken, at any rate locally. Twenty minutes to half an hour after that, he was unfortunately killed in his car –although it is not absolutely certain whether he was killed by Indonesians who were approaching his car; which exploded simultaneously with the attack on him.
I do not think this amounts to charge of foul murder …..because my information came absolutely at first hand from a British officer who was actually on the spot at the moment, whose bona fides I have no reason to question…..”
“….. some of the press reports from Indonesia have been entirely responsible. In particular, I have learned from officers who have recently returned that some of the stories which have been told, not only in the newspaper, but, I am sorry to say, from the Government Front Bench in his House, have been very far from accurate and have innecessarily imparted prejudice and concerns the lamented death of Brigadier Mallaby. That was announced to us as a foul murder, and we accepted it as such. I have learned from officers who were present when it happened the exact details and it is perfectly clear that Brigadier Mallaby was not murdered but was honourably killed in action……. The incident was somewhat confused –as such incidents are- but it took place in and near Union Square in Surabaya. There had been discussions about a truce earlier in the day. A large crowd of Indonesians –a mob if you like- had gathered in the square and were in a rather excited state.
About 20 Indians, in a building on the other side of the square, had been cut off from telephonic communication and did not know about the truce. They were firing sporadically on the mob. Brigadier Mallaby came out from the discussions, walked straight into the crowd, with great courage, and shouted to the Indians to cease fire. They obeyed him. Possibly half an hour later, the mob in the square became turbulent again. Brigadier Mallaby, at a certain point in the proceedings, ordered the Indians to open fire again. They opened fire with two Bren Guns and the mob dispersed and went to cover; then fighting broke out again in good earnest. It is apparent that when Brigadier Mallaby gave the order to open fire again, the truce was in fact broken, at any rate locally. Twenty minutes to half an hour after that, he was unfortunately killed in his car –although it is not absolutely certain whether he was killed by Indonesians who were approaching his car; which exploded simultaneously with the attack on him.
I do not think this amounts to charge of foul murder …..because my information came absolutely at first hand from a British officer who was actually on the spot at the moment, whose bona fides I have no reason to question…..”
Di sini Tom Driberg meragukan, bahwa Mallaby terbunuh oleh orang Indonesia. Dia menyatakan:
“….it is not absolutely certain whether he was killed by Indonesians who were approaching his car; which exploded simultaneously with the attack on him.”
“….it is not absolutely certain whether he was killed by Indonesians who were approaching his car; which exploded simultaneously with the attack on him.”
Selanjutnya
dia juga membantah, bahwa tewasnya Mallaby akibat “dibunuh secara
licik” (foully murdered). Kelihatannya pihak pimpinan tentara Inggris
-untuk membangkitkan/memperkuat rasa antipati terhadap Indonesia- rela
mendegradasi kematian seorang perwira tinggi menjadi “dibunuh secara
licik” daripada menyatakan “killed in action” –tewas dalam pertempuran-
yang menjadi kehormatan bagi setiap prajurit.
Juga penuturan Venu K. Gopal, waktu itu berpangkat Mayor, yang adalah Komandan Kompi D, Batalion 6, Mahratta.
Kompi D ini mengambil tempat pertahanan di Gedung Internatio. Tanggal 8
Agustus 1974, dia menulis kepada J.G.A. Parrot antara lain :
“Let me first give you some background. “D” Coy had been under fire off and on and had already casualties. The firing came from other buildings on the square and by and large we were able to contain it. We could, however, see that armed men barred all the exits from the square.
Meanwhile armed Indonesians swarmed over to the veranda of the building and I had to bluntly tell them that I would fire if they started pressing into the building. By this time I could not see Brigade Mallaby or the LOs (Liaison Officers) because of the crowds on the veranda.
Just then Capt. Shaw and Kundan ( I did not know their names at that time) tried to get into the building but were prevented. Kundan then shouted to the crowd that he would get us surrender and he and Capt.Shaw were then allowed to go into the building if they took an Indonesian officer with them. I allowed them in hoping to play for time. After a little time Kundan went out of the building, leaving Capt. Shaw and the Indonesian Officer behind.
Soon thereafter the armed men started pushing in and I was left with no option but to open fire. The Decision was mine and mine alone. Capt. Smith is correct when he says that BM (Mallaby-pen.) did not give any orders to Capt. Shaw..”
“Let me first give you some background. “D” Coy had been under fire off and on and had already casualties. The firing came from other buildings on the square and by and large we were able to contain it. We could, however, see that armed men barred all the exits from the square.
Meanwhile armed Indonesians swarmed over to the veranda of the building and I had to bluntly tell them that I would fire if they started pressing into the building. By this time I could not see Brigade Mallaby or the LOs (Liaison Officers) because of the crowds on the veranda.
Just then Capt. Shaw and Kundan ( I did not know their names at that time) tried to get into the building but were prevented. Kundan then shouted to the crowd that he would get us surrender and he and Capt.Shaw were then allowed to go into the building if they took an Indonesian officer with them. I allowed them in hoping to play for time. After a little time Kundan went out of the building, leaving Capt. Shaw and the Indonesian Officer behind.
Soon thereafter the armed men started pushing in and I was left with no option but to open fire. The Decision was mine and mine alone. Capt. Smith is correct when he says that BM (Mallaby-pen.) did not give any orders to Capt. Shaw..”
Dengan
pengakuan Mayor Gopal, Komandan Kompi D yang bertahan di Gedung
Internatio, sekarang terbukti, bahwa yang memulai menembak adalah pihak
Inggris; tetapi kelihatannya dia masih ingin melindungi bekas atasannya
dengan menggarisbawahi, bahwa perintah menembak tersebut adalah
keputusannya sendiri. Ini jelas bertentangan dengan kesaksian T.D. Kundan, yang diperkuat dengan kesaksian seorang perwira Inggris melalui Tom Driberg.
Dengan
pengakuan ini terlihat jelas, bahwa Inggris pada waktu itu memutar
balikkan fakta dan menuduh bahwa gencatan senjata telah dilanggar pihak
Indonesia (the truce which had been broken). Di dalam situasi tegang
bunyi ledakan ataupun tembakan akan menimbulkan kepanikan pada
kelompok-kelompok yang masih diliputi suasana tempur, sehingga tembakan
tersebut segera dibalas; maka pertempuran di seputar Gedung Internatio
pun pecah lagi.
Dari pengakuan kedua perwira Inggris tersebut telah jelas, bahwa pemicu terjadinya tembak-menembak adalah pihak Inggris sendiri. Dugaan ini sebenarnya tepat, bila disimak jalan pikiran Mallaby, seperti dituliskan oleh Capt. Smith:
“…He (Mallaby, red.) did not believe in the safe-conducts in so far as it applied to us, but thought that some at least of the Company might get away. Accordingly Capt. Shaw was sent into the building to give the necessary orders…..”
“…He (Mallaby, red.) did not believe in the safe-conducts in so far as it applied to us, but thought that some at least of the Company might get away. Accordingly Capt. Shaw was sent into the building to give the necessary orders…..”
Sebelum itu, menurut Smith, telah terjadi perbedaan pendapat antara Kapten Shaw dan Mallaby mengenai
permintaan para pemuda Indonesia, agar tentara Inggris meninggalkan
persenjataan mereka di dalam gedung. Awalnya, Kapten Shaw menyetujui
permintaan ini, tetapi Mallaby kemudian membatalkannya. Smith :
“…Eventually, the mob demanded that the troops in the building laid (sic) down their arms and marched (sic) out: they and us (sic) guaranteed a safeconduct back to the air field. The Brigadier flatly refused to consider this proposal. After further pressure, however, Capt.Shaw, who was well known to some of the indonesians through his job as FSO, and who had been a considerable strain since our arrival in Surabaya, agreed to the terms on his own responsibility. The Brigadier at once countemanded this………”
“…Eventually, the mob demanded that the troops in the building laid (sic) down their arms and marched (sic) out: they and us (sic) guaranteed a safeconduct back to the air field. The Brigadier flatly refused to consider this proposal. After further pressure, however, Capt.Shaw, who was well known to some of the indonesians through his job as FSO, and who had been a considerable strain since our arrival in Surabaya, agreed to the terms on his own responsibility. The Brigadier at once countemanded this………”
Uraian Tom Driberg di Parlemen Inggris (House of Commons) kelihatannya keterangannya diperoleh dari Kapten Shaw.
Kemudian
tuduhan kedua, bahwa orang Indonesia “secara licik membunuh Mallaby”,
perlu diteliti lebih lanjut. Di pihak Indonesia banyak orang mengaku
bahwa dialah yang menembak Mallaby. Hj. Lukitaningsih I.
Rajamin-Supandhan mencatat, ada sekitar 12 orang yang mengaku sebagai
yang menembak Mallaby. Namun menurut penilaian beberapa pelaku sejarah,
dari sejumlah keterangan yang diberikan, cerita yang benar kemungkinan
besar yang disampaikan oleh Abdul Azis. (Lihat: Barlan Setiadijaya, 10
November 1945…., hlm. 429-435.) Dul Arnowo mencatat laporan seorang
saksi mata, Ali Harun, yang kemudian diteruskan ke Presiden Sukarno.
Surat tersebut dibawa oleh Kolonel dr. W. Hutagalung ke Jakarta, dan
diserahkan langsung kepada Presiden Sukarno pada tanggal 8 November
1945.
Dari
berbagai penuturan, memang benar adanya penembakan dengan menggunakan
pistol oleh seorang pemuda Indonesia ke arah Mallaby, tetapi tidak ada
seorang pun yang dapat memastikan, bahwa Mallaby memang tewas akibat
tembakan tersebut. Yang menarik untuk dicermati adalah pengakuan Kapten R.C. Smith dari Batalyon 6,
Resimen Mahratta, yang pada waktu itu menjabat sebagai Liaison Officer
Brigade 49. Tanggal 31 Oktober, dia memberikan laporannya yang pertama,
kemudian pada bulan Februari, sehubungan dengan keterangan Tom Driberg
di House of Commons. Laporan Smith dimuat oleh J.G.A. Parrot, dalam
analisisnya, Who Killed Brigadier Mallaby? Kapten R.C. Smith menulis:
“The Report by Capt. R.C. Smith.
At
approximately 1230 hrs. on 30th October, Capt T.L. Laughland and I were
ordered by Col. L.H.O.Pugh, DSO, 2i/c (Second in Command) of the Bde.,
to proceed to the Government offices, where we were each to collect an
Indonesian representative. From there one of us was to go north, and the
other south, through the town, and try to persuade the mobs to go back
to their barracks. Brigadier Mallaby was at this time in conference with
the Governor in the Government Offices.
On arrival there, we were told by the Brigadier that the Indonesians had refused to treat with anyone except him. Accordingly we set off with the Brigadier and the FSO (Field Security Officer), Capt. Shaw, plus the leaders of the various parties, in several cars, the foremost of which was flying the white flag.
The first place to which we went was a large building about 150 yards west of the Kali Mas River, which runs north and south through the town. One Coy of the 6 Mahrattas had been having a very stiff fight in this building against about five hundred Indonesians, and had been in considerable difficulties.
On our arrival there, the mob was collected round the cars, and the various party leaders made speeches to them, in an attempt to persuade them to return to their barracks. The speeches were at first quite well received, and the necessary promises given.
We then got into our cars and set off for the next position. We had only gone about 100 yards when we were stopped by the mob aproximately 20 yards from the Kali Mas. From then on the situation rapidly deteriorated. The mob leaders began to incite the mob, and the party leaders gradually lost control. The mob, which up to that time had seemed fairly friendly towards us, became distinctly menacing: swords were waved, and pistols pointed at us and we were left with very little doubt as to their intentions.
Eventually, the mob demanded that the troops in the building laid (sic) down their arms and marched (sic) out: they and us (sic) guaranteed a safe-conduct back to the air field. The Brigadier flatly refused to consider this proposal. After further pressure, however, Capt.Shaw, who was well known to some of the indonesians through his job as FSO, and who had been under a considerable strain since our arrival in Surabaya, agreed to the terms on his own responsibility. The Brigadier at once countemanded this: on further consideration, he decided that the company had been in so bad a position before, that any further fighting would lead to their being wiped out.
He did not believe in the safe-conduct in so far as it applied to us, but thought that some at least of the company might get away. Accordingly Capt. Shaw was sent into the building to give the necessary orders.
The rest of us were disarmed – except for a grenade which Capt. Laughland managed to keep concealed – and made to sit in one of the cars.
The Brigadier was on the side nearest to the Kali Mas, Capt. Laughland in the middle, and myself on the outside nearest to the building in which our troops were.
When Capt. Shaw got into the building, the Indonesians brought up a machine gun to cover the entrance. He and the company commander decided that any attempt to walk out unarmed would lead to a massacre and so the order to open fire was given.
As soon as the firing started, the three of us who were in the car crouched down on the floor as far as possible. An Indonesian came up to the Brigadier’s window with a rifle. He fired four shots at three of us, all of which missed. He went away while we shammed dead. The battle went on for about two and a half hours, to about 2030 hrs, by which time it was dark. At the end of that time, the firing died down to some extent, and we could hear shouting as though the Indonesians were being collected. Two of them came up to the car and attempted to drive it away. That failed and one of them opened the back door on the Brigadier’s side. The Brigadier moved, and as they saw from that, that he was still alive, he spoke to them and asked to be taken to one of the party leaders. The two Indonesians went away to discuss this, and one of them came back to the front door on the Brigadier’s side. The Brigadier spoke to him again, the Indonesian answered, and then suddenly reached his hand in through the front window, and shot the Brigadier. It took from fifteen seconds to half-a-minute for the Brigadier to die, but from the noise he made at the end, there was absolutely no doubt that he was dead. (Notes from Parrot: This was the first time that these details of the final moments of Brigadier Mallaby had been made public. In this second report Smith offered the following explanation:”In the report made by Capt.Laughland and myself the following morning we stated that the Brigadier was killed instantly. This was done in order to spare the feelings of the family.”)
As soon as he had fired, the Indonesian ducked down beside the car, and remained there until after the Brigadier was dead. I took the pin out of the grenade which Capt.Laughland had previously passed to me, and waited. The Indonesian appeared again, and fired another shot which grazed Capt. Laughland’s shoulder. I let go the lever of the grenade, held it for two seconds to make sure it was not returned and threw it out of the open door by Brigadier’s body. As soon as it had exploded, Capt. Laughland and I went out of the door on my side of the car, waited for a short time, then ran around the car and dived into the Kali Mas. As the two Indonesians by the side of the car did not attemp to interfere with us it is presumed that they were killed by the grenade—which also set the back seat of the car on fire. After five hours in the Kali Mas, we managed to reach our troops in the Dock area.”
On arrival there, we were told by the Brigadier that the Indonesians had refused to treat with anyone except him. Accordingly we set off with the Brigadier and the FSO (Field Security Officer), Capt. Shaw, plus the leaders of the various parties, in several cars, the foremost of which was flying the white flag.
The first place to which we went was a large building about 150 yards west of the Kali Mas River, which runs north and south through the town. One Coy of the 6 Mahrattas had been having a very stiff fight in this building against about five hundred Indonesians, and had been in considerable difficulties.
On our arrival there, the mob was collected round the cars, and the various party leaders made speeches to them, in an attempt to persuade them to return to their barracks. The speeches were at first quite well received, and the necessary promises given.
We then got into our cars and set off for the next position. We had only gone about 100 yards when we were stopped by the mob aproximately 20 yards from the Kali Mas. From then on the situation rapidly deteriorated. The mob leaders began to incite the mob, and the party leaders gradually lost control. The mob, which up to that time had seemed fairly friendly towards us, became distinctly menacing: swords were waved, and pistols pointed at us and we were left with very little doubt as to their intentions.
Eventually, the mob demanded that the troops in the building laid (sic) down their arms and marched (sic) out: they and us (sic) guaranteed a safe-conduct back to the air field. The Brigadier flatly refused to consider this proposal. After further pressure, however, Capt.Shaw, who was well known to some of the indonesians through his job as FSO, and who had been under a considerable strain since our arrival in Surabaya, agreed to the terms on his own responsibility. The Brigadier at once countemanded this: on further consideration, he decided that the company had been in so bad a position before, that any further fighting would lead to their being wiped out.
He did not believe in the safe-conduct in so far as it applied to us, but thought that some at least of the company might get away. Accordingly Capt. Shaw was sent into the building to give the necessary orders.
The rest of us were disarmed – except for a grenade which Capt. Laughland managed to keep concealed – and made to sit in one of the cars.
The Brigadier was on the side nearest to the Kali Mas, Capt. Laughland in the middle, and myself on the outside nearest to the building in which our troops were.
When Capt. Shaw got into the building, the Indonesians brought up a machine gun to cover the entrance. He and the company commander decided that any attempt to walk out unarmed would lead to a massacre and so the order to open fire was given.
As soon as the firing started, the three of us who were in the car crouched down on the floor as far as possible. An Indonesian came up to the Brigadier’s window with a rifle. He fired four shots at three of us, all of which missed. He went away while we shammed dead. The battle went on for about two and a half hours, to about 2030 hrs, by which time it was dark. At the end of that time, the firing died down to some extent, and we could hear shouting as though the Indonesians were being collected. Two of them came up to the car and attempted to drive it away. That failed and one of them opened the back door on the Brigadier’s side. The Brigadier moved, and as they saw from that, that he was still alive, he spoke to them and asked to be taken to one of the party leaders. The two Indonesians went away to discuss this, and one of them came back to the front door on the Brigadier’s side. The Brigadier spoke to him again, the Indonesian answered, and then suddenly reached his hand in through the front window, and shot the Brigadier. It took from fifteen seconds to half-a-minute for the Brigadier to die, but from the noise he made at the end, there was absolutely no doubt that he was dead. (Notes from Parrot: This was the first time that these details of the final moments of Brigadier Mallaby had been made public. In this second report Smith offered the following explanation:”In the report made by Capt.Laughland and myself the following morning we stated that the Brigadier was killed instantly. This was done in order to spare the feelings of the family.”)
As soon as he had fired, the Indonesian ducked down beside the car, and remained there until after the Brigadier was dead. I took the pin out of the grenade which Capt.Laughland had previously passed to me, and waited. The Indonesian appeared again, and fired another shot which grazed Capt. Laughland’s shoulder. I let go the lever of the grenade, held it for two seconds to make sure it was not returned and threw it out of the open door by Brigadier’s body. As soon as it had exploded, Capt. Laughland and I went out of the door on my side of the car, waited for a short time, then ran around the car and dived into the Kali Mas. As the two Indonesians by the side of the car did not attemp to interfere with us it is presumed that they were killed by the grenade—which also set the back seat of the car on fire. After five hours in the Kali Mas, we managed to reach our troops in the Dock area.”
Keterangan
Smith ini a.l. menguatkan penjelasan Gopal, bahwa memang benar pihak
Inggris yang memulai penembakan. Kesaksian Smith ini mirip dengan
keterangan Abdul Azis; dan ternyata dia tidak mati seperti dugaan Smith.
Sehubungan
dengan penembakan dengan senapan yang terjadi sebelum penembakan
terhadap Mallaby, dalam surat kepada Parrot tertanggal 23 November 1973,
Smith menulis antara lain:
“I have no idea what hapenned to the four shots from the rifleman. He approached the car from the left (the Brigadiers side) with the rifle at the ready, and looking at the three of us. I am not ashamed to say at this point I shut my eyes and started counting the shots!
I think all three of us were equally surprised at finding both ourselves and the others alive afterwards!”
“I have no idea what hapenned to the four shots from the rifleman. He approached the car from the left (the Brigadiers side) with the rifle at the ready, and looking at the three of us. I am not ashamed to say at this point I shut my eyes and started counting the shots!
I think all three of us were equally surprised at finding both ourselves and the others alive afterwards!”
Tentu
sangat luar biasa, bahwa menembak tiga orang yang sedang duduk di dalam
mobil yang sempit dengan empat tembakan, namun tak satupun yang
mengena. Hal ini menunjukkan, bahwa dapat dipastikan, pemilik senapan
itu baru pertama kali menembak, sehingga menembak tiga orang dengan
jarak mungkin paling tinggi 2 meter, empat tembakan meleset semua.
Mengenai ciri-ciri penembak Mallaby, dalam surat kepada Parrot tanggal 20 Februari 1974, Smith menulis:
“… the indonesian who killed the Brigadier was a young lad around 16 or 17 approximately, but it was too dark to see whether he was wearing any sort of uniform. The weapon was an automatic pistol …”
“… the indonesian who killed the Brigadier was a young lad around 16 or 17 approximately, but it was too dark to see whether he was wearing any sort of uniform. The weapon was an automatic pistol …”
Kemudian pada 20 Februari 1974, Smith menulis kepada Parrot yang isinya antara lain:
“I have no recollection of the conversation that the Indian interpreter reported and while I certainly could not state that I heard everything that happenned, I think I should have remembered this, if not now after 30 years, certainly at the time when I wrote my report. However, in all fairness, I must say that there were moments when my attention was distracted from the Brigadier myself. For instance, I can remember spending some time trying to convince a very angry young Indonesian that I had not personally be responsible for his brother’s death.
Going back to my report, the position of all of us was very closely gouped around one car so that there was only a matter of a very few feet between us. Therefore, Brigadier Mallaby was certainly able to hear when Captain Shaw agreed to the demands of the mob, which was why he was able to countermand it immediately. As I said, he then changed his mind in the hope that some of the men at least might reach safety, but the orders that he gave Captain Shaw were that the troops in the building should lay down their arms and come out unarmed, in the hope of safe-conduct.
I definitely did not hear any suggestion that they should be ordered to open fire after a certain length of time had elapsed. The one thing that has always been quite firmly established in my memory is that the orders to fire were given by Captain Shaw once he had got into the building.”
“I have no recollection of the conversation that the Indian interpreter reported and while I certainly could not state that I heard everything that happenned, I think I should have remembered this, if not now after 30 years, certainly at the time when I wrote my report. However, in all fairness, I must say that there were moments when my attention was distracted from the Brigadier myself. For instance, I can remember spending some time trying to convince a very angry young Indonesian that I had not personally be responsible for his brother’s death.
Going back to my report, the position of all of us was very closely gouped around one car so that there was only a matter of a very few feet between us. Therefore, Brigadier Mallaby was certainly able to hear when Captain Shaw agreed to the demands of the mob, which was why he was able to countermand it immediately. As I said, he then changed his mind in the hope that some of the men at least might reach safety, but the orders that he gave Captain Shaw were that the troops in the building should lay down their arms and come out unarmed, in the hope of safe-conduct.
I definitely did not hear any suggestion that they should be ordered to open fire after a certain length of time had elapsed. The one thing that has always been quite firmly established in my memory is that the orders to fire were given by Captain Shaw once he had got into the building.”
Yang
perlu diragukan di sini adalah dugaan Smith, bahwa Mallaby tewas
sebagai akibat tembakan pistol pemuda Indonesia. Seperti dalam
tulisannya, dia mengatakan bahwa pada saat itu sekitar pukul 20.30 dan
keadaan gelap. Memang aliran listrik di daerah tersebut telah diputus
oleh pihak Indonesia. Dia hanya mengatakan:
“…berdasarkan suara yang didengar dari arah Mallaby, dia yakin bahwa Mallaby telah tewas 15 – 30 detik setelah ditembak dengan pistol…”
“…berdasarkan suara yang didengar dari arah Mallaby, dia yakin bahwa Mallaby telah tewas 15 – 30 detik setelah ditembak dengan pistol…”
Selain
itu dia juga mengakui, bahwa granat yang dilemparkannya melewati tubuh
Mallaby telah mengakibatkan terbakarnya jok belakang mobil mereka,
artinya tempat Mallaby duduk.
Menurut
pemeriksaan di rumah sakit, jenazah Mallaby sangat sulit dikenali,
karena hangus dan hancur. Dia dikenali melalui tanda bekas jam tangan di
kedua lengannya, karena Mallaby dikenal dengan kebiasaannya untuk
memakai dua jam tangan; jadi bukan identifikasi wajah atau ciri-ciri
tubuh lain. Hal ini disampaikan oleh dr. Sugiri, kepada Kolonel dr. W.
Hutagalung.
Seandainya
keterangan Smith benar, bahwa Mallaby tidak memberikan perintah untuk
memulai menembak, bahkan sebaliknya, yaitu menginstruksikan Kapten Shaw
untuk memerintahkan tentara Inggris yang di dalam gedung agar mereka
meletakkan senjata dan ke luar gedung tanpa senjata, maka telah terjadi
pembangkangan yang berakibat fatal, yaitu perintah dari komandan kompi,
Mayor Gopal, untuk memulai menembak. Dilihat dari sudut mana pun, timbulnya tembak-menembak yang berakibat tewasnya Mallaby, adalah kesalahan tentara Inggris.
Mengenai
tuduhan bahwa Mallaby tewas akibat tembakan pistol, sangat diragukan.
Jelas untuk membela diri, Smith dan Laughland harus menyatakan dahulu
bahwa Mallaby telah tewas ketika Smith melemparkan granat, yang kemudian
justru membakar bagian belakang mobil yang mereka dan Mallaby tumpangi.
Beberapa saksi mata di pihak Indonesia mengatakan bahwa mobil Mallaby
meledak akibat granat tersebut sehingga dengan demikian, boleh dikatakan
Mallaby tewas karena kesalahan pihak Inggris sendiri. Dari kronologi kejadian dapat disimpulkan, bahwa Mallaby tewas karena tembak-menembak berkobar lagi.
Yang sangat menarik untuk dicermati sehubungan dengan pelemparan granat oleh Kapten Smith, adalah kesaksian Imam Sutrisno Trisnaningprojo,
seorang pemuda berpangkat kapten, mantan anggota PETA. Trisnaningprojo
ikut dalam iring-iringan mobil dalam rangka penyebarluasan hasil
kesepakatan Sukarno-Hawthorn. Bahwa Smith adalah orang yang melemparkan granat yang mengakibatkan mobil yang ditumpangi Mallaby terbakar,
diakui oleh Smith sendiri, tetapi Trisnaningprodjo menuturkan, bahwa
Smith tidak berada di dalam mobil bersama Mallaby, melainkan bersama
Laughland di luar mobil ketika terjadi penembakan terhadap Mallaby.
Trisnaningprojo melihat, Smith berada di dekat gedung dan melemparkan
granat ke arah pemuda yang menembak Mallaby, tetapi granat meledak di
sebelah mobil Mallaby yang pintu belakangnya terbuka. Jadi, Captain
Smith melempar granat tidak dari dalam mobil, melainkan dari luar mobil.
Ini berarti bahwa tidak ada yang mengetahui kondisi Mallaby setelah
penembakan dari pemuda Indonesia tersebut, apakah terluka atau memang
telah tewas seperti penuturan Smith.
Baik
dari kesaksian Smith, maupun keterangan Trisnaningprojo yang dilengkapi
sketsa lokasi pada saat kejadian, pemuda Indonesia menembak dengan
pistol ke arah Mallaby melalui jendela depan di sisi kiri mobil,
sedangkan Mallaby –masih menurut Smith- duduk di jok belakang, di sisi
paling kiri. Dari posisi pemuda Indonesia tersebut, walaupun dia
menggunakan tangan kiri, kemungkinan besar bagian tubuh Mallaby sebelah
kanan yang akan terkena tembakan, dan ini biasanya tidak mematikan.
Berbeda, apabila yang terkena adalah tubuh bagian kiri, di bagian
jantung.
Di
samping itu, juga tidak ada yang bisa memastikan, bahwa tembakan pemuda
tersebut benar mengenai sasaran karena sebelumnya -juga menurut Smith-
ketika bertiga masih duduk di bagian belakang mobil, ada yang menembak
ke arah mereka dengan senapan sebanyak empat kali, namun tak satu peluru
pun yang mengenai mereka. Tidak tertutup kemungkinan, bahwa pemuda yang
menembak dengan pistol, juga baru pertama kali memegang pistol,
sehingga belum mahir menggunakannya.
Ketika diwawancarai oleh Ben Anderson pada tanggal 13 Agustus 1962, Dul Arnowo menyatakan, bahwa dia yakin Mallaby secara tidak sengaja, telah terbunuh oleh anak buahnya sendiri.
Dalam laporan rahasia kepada atasannya, Kolonel Laurens van der Post
mantan Gubernur Militer Inggris di Batavia/Jakarta tahun 1945,
menuliskan (Sir Laurens van der Post, The Admiral’s Baby, John Murray,
London, 1996):
“The detail of what happenned at Sourabaya is not really relevant to this review but it is interresting that the very latest evidence suggests that the Mallaby Murder, far from being premiditatet or a deliberate breach of faith, was caused more by the indescribable confusion and nervous excitement of everyone in the town. Had General Hawthorn, the General Officer Commanding Java at the same time, had proper Civil Affairs and political officers on his staff to draft his unfortunate proclamations for him and to keep [in] continuous and informed contact with population, the story of Sourabaya may well have been different.
“The detail of what happenned at Sourabaya is not really relevant to this review but it is interresting that the very latest evidence suggests that the Mallaby Murder, far from being premiditatet or a deliberate breach of faith, was caused more by the indescribable confusion and nervous excitement of everyone in the town. Had General Hawthorn, the General Officer Commanding Java at the same time, had proper Civil Affairs and political officers on his staff to draft his unfortunate proclamations for him and to keep [in] continuous and informed contact with population, the story of Sourabaya may well have been different.
0 comments:
Posting Komentar