Battle of Surabaya is a historical event of war between the Indonesian army and Dutch troops. This great event occurred on November 10, 1945 in the city of Surabaya, East Java. This battle is the first war of Indonesian forces by foreign troops after the Proclamation of Independence of Indonesia and one of the largest and heaviest battle in the history of the Indonesian National Revolution which became a national symbol on Indonesian resistance against colonialism.
Chronology of events causes
The arrival of Japanese troops to Indonesia
March 1, 1942, Japanese troops landed on the island of Java, and seven days later, on March 8, 1945, the Dutch colonial government surrendered unconditionally to Japan under the agreement Kalidjati. After the unconditional surrender proficiency level, Indonesia formally annexed by Japan.
Proclamation of Indonesian Independence
Three years later, Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allies after the dropping of the atomic bomb (the United States) in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The incident occurred in August 1945. In the foreign power vacuum, then Sukarno proclaimed Indonesia's independence on August 17, 1945.
The arrival of the British Army & amp; NetherlandsAfter the defeat of the Japanese, the people and fighters Indonesia attempted to disarm the Japanese troops. So there was the battles which claimed in many areas. When the movement to disarm the Japanese troops were blazing, September 15, 1945, British troops landed in Jakarta, then landed in Surabaya on October 25, 1945. The British are coming to Indonesia joined in AFNEI (Allied Forces Netherlands East Indies) and a decision on behalf of the Bloc ally, with the task to disarm the Japanese troops, freeing prisoners of war detained Japan, as well as repatriate Japanese troops to the country. But besides the British soldiers who came also a mission to restore Indonesia to the Dutch government administration as a colony of the Dutch East Indies. NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) come ride with a group of British soldiers for that purpose. This has sparked turmoil led to the movement of the people of Indonesia and the Indonesian people resistance everywhere against the army and government AFNEI NICA.
“Let me first give you some background. “D” Coy had been under fire off and on and had already casualties. The firing came from other buildings on the square and by and large we were able to contain it. We could, however, see that armed men barred all the exits from the square.
Meanwhile armed Indonesians swarmed over to the veranda of the building and I had to bluntly tell them that I would fire if they started pressing into the building. By this time I could not see Brigade Mallaby or the LOs (Liaison Officers) because of the crowds on the veranda.
Just then Capt. Shaw and Kundan ( I did not know their names at that time) tried to get into the building but were prevented. Kundan then shouted to the crowd that he would get us surrender and he and Capt.Shaw were then allowed to go into the building if they took an Indonesian officer with them. I allowed them in hoping to play for time. After a little time Kundan went out of the building, leaving Capt. Shaw and the Indonesian Officer behind.
Soon thereafter the armed men started pushing in and I was left with no option but to open fire. The Decision was mine and mine alone. Capt. Smith is correct when he says that BM (Mallaby-pen.) did not give any orders to Capt. Shaw..”
In connection with the shotgun shooting that occurred prior to the shooting of Mallaby, in a letter to Parrot dated November 23, 1973, Smith wrote, among others:
Chronology of events causes
The arrival of Japanese troops to Indonesia
March 1, 1942, Japanese troops landed on the island of Java, and seven days later, on March 8, 1945, the Dutch colonial government surrendered unconditionally to Japan under the agreement Kalidjati. After the unconditional surrender proficiency level, Indonesia formally annexed by Japan.
Proclamation of Indonesian Independence
Three years later, Japan surrendered unconditionally to the Allies after the dropping of the atomic bomb (the United States) in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The incident occurred in August 1945. In the foreign power vacuum, then Sukarno proclaimed Indonesia's independence on August 17, 1945.
The arrival of the British Army & amp; NetherlandsAfter the defeat of the Japanese, the people and fighters Indonesia attempted to disarm the Japanese troops. So there was the battles which claimed in many areas. When the movement to disarm the Japanese troops were blazing, September 15, 1945, British troops landed in Jakarta, then landed in Surabaya on October 25, 1945. The British are coming to Indonesia joined in AFNEI (Allied Forces Netherlands East Indies) and a decision on behalf of the Bloc ally, with the task to disarm the Japanese troops, freeing prisoners of war detained Japan, as well as repatriate Japanese troops to the country. But besides the British soldiers who came also a mission to restore Indonesia to the Dutch government administration as a colony of the Dutch East Indies. NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) come ride with a group of British soldiers for that purpose. This has sparked turmoil led to the movement of the people of Indonesia and the Indonesian people resistance everywhere against the army and government AFNEI NICA.
Incident at Hotel Yamato, Tunjungan, Surabaya
After the emergence of the Indonesian government edict dated August 31, 1945 which stipulates that from 1 September 1945 the national flag Sang Saka Merah Putih flown continuously throughout Indonesia, the flag hoisting movement increasingly extends to all corners of the city of Surabaya. Climactic movement in Surabaya flag incident occurred on perobekan flag in Yamato Hoteru / Hotel Yamato (named Oranje Hotel or Hotel Orange in colonial times, now named Hotel Majapahit) on Jl. Tunjungan no. 65 Surabaya.
After the emergence of the Indonesian government edict dated August 31, 1945 which stipulates that from 1 September 1945 the national flag Sang Saka Merah Putih flown continuously throughout Indonesia, the flag hoisting movement increasingly extends to all corners of the city of Surabaya. Climactic movement in Surabaya flag incident occurred on perobekan flag in Yamato Hoteru / Hotel Yamato (named Oranje Hotel or Hotel Orange in colonial times, now named Hotel Majapahit) on Jl. Tunjungan no. 65 Surabaya.
A group of Dutch people under the leadership of Mr. WVCh Ploegman on the afternoon of September 18, 1945, exactly at 21:00, flying the flag of the Netherlands (Red-White-Blue), without the approval of the Regional Government of Indonesia Surabaya, on pole at the top level Hotel Yamato, north side. The next day the youth of Surabaya saw it and became angry because they assume Netherlands had insulted the sovereignty of Indonesia, was about to return the power back in Indonesia, and harassing the flag hoisting movement ongoing in Surabaya.
Shortly
after mengumpulnya mass at Hotel Yamato, Resident Sudirman, warrior and
diplomat who was then serving as Deputy Resident (Fuku Syuco Gunseikan)
are still recognized by the government of Dai Nippon Surabaya Syu, as
well as the Regional Resident Surabaya Indonesian Government, came past
the crowd and entered Yamato escorted to the hotel and Hariyono Sidik. As he conferred with representatives RI Mr. Ploegman and his friends and asked that the flag of the Netherlands immediately derived from Yamato Hotel building. In
these negotiations Ploegman refused to lower the flag of the
Netherlands and refuses to recognize the sovereignty of Indonesia. The talks heated up, Ploegman pulled out a gun, and a fight broke out in the negotiating room. Ploegman
died strangled by Sidik, who then also killed by Dutch troops who guard
and heard the pistol shot Ploegman, while Sudirman and Hariyono fled
abroad Hotel Yamato. Most youth scramble up to the top of the hotel to reduce the Dutch flag. Hariyono
originally shared Sudirman back into the hotel and was involved in
climbing the flagpole and together Kusno Wibowo managed to lose the
Dutch flag, ripped part of the blue, and mengereknya back to the top of
the flagpole as the flag.
After the incident at the Yamato Hotel, on October 27, 1945 the first battle erupted between Indonesia against British troops. The small attacks later turned into a general strike that many casualties on both sides Indonesia and England, before finally General DC Hawthorn ask for help President Sukarno to defuse the situation.
The death of Brigadier General MallabyAfter
the cease-fire between the Indonesian and British soldiers parties
signed on October 29, 1945, the state gradually subside. Nevertheless it still happens armed clashes between the people and the British soldiers in Surabaya. Armed
clashes in the Surabaya culminated with the murder of Brigadier General
Mallaby, (led British troops to East Java), on October 30, 1945 at
around 20:30. Buick car carrying Brigadier General Mallaby passed by a group of Indonesian militia when it will pass Red Bridge. Misunderstanding
leads to a shootout that ended with the death of Brigadier General
Mallaby by a pistol shot a young Indonesian man who hitherto
unidentified, and the burning of the car is hit by a grenade explosion
that caused the bodies Mallaby unrecognizable. Mallaby's
death led to the British angry with the Indonesian side and resulted in
the replacement decision Mallaby, Major General EC Mansergh
for issuing the ultimatum 10 November 1945 to ask the Indonesian side
surrendered their arms and cease resistance to the army and
administration AFNEI NICA.
The debate about the cause of crossfire
Tom Driberg, a British MP from British Labour Party (Labour Party). On February 20, 1946, in a debate in the British Parliament (House of Commons) doubted that the shootout was initiated by the Indonesian army. He said that the incident was allegedly strong crossfire arise due to misunderstandings 20 member Indian squad led Mallaby who started the firefight did not know that the ceasefire in force because they are cut off from contact and telecommunications. The following excerpt from Tom Driberg:
Tom Driberg, a British MP from British Labour Party (Labour Party). On February 20, 1946, in a debate in the British Parliament (House of Commons) doubted that the shootout was initiated by the Indonesian army. He said that the incident was allegedly strong crossfire arise due to misunderstandings 20 member Indian squad led Mallaby who started the firefight did not know that the ceasefire in force because they are cut off from contact and telecommunications. The following excerpt from Tom Driberg:
"...
About 20 people (soldiers) India (owned by the British), in a building
on the other side of the square, has been cut off from communication by
phone and did not know about the ceasefire. They shot sporadically at mass (Indonesia). Brigadier
Mallaby out of the discussion (truce), walk straight into the crowd,
with great courage, and shouted to the Indian soldiers to stop firing. They are obedient to him. Maybe half an hour later, a mass in the square become turbulent again. Brigadier Mallaby, at a certain point in the discussion, ordered Indian troops to shoot again. They opened fire with two guns Bren and mass broke up and run for cover; then broke again with a really intense battle. It
is clear that when Brigadier Mallaby gave the order to open fire again,
negotiating cease-fire has actually broken out, at least locally. Twenty
minutes to half an hour after that, he (Mallaby) unfortunately was
killed in a car-though (we) are not really sure if he was killed by the
Indonesian people who approached his car; which exploded simultaneously with the attack against him (Mallaby).
I think this can not be accused of murder sneaky ... I can as soon as possible because the information from witnesses, that a British officer who actually exist in the scene at the time, the intention honest I had no reason to question ... "
Ultimatum 10 November 1945
After the killing of Brigadier General Mallaby, his successor, Major General Mansergh issued an ultimatum stating that all the leaders and the people of Indonesia are armed to report and put the gun in a specified place and surrendered with arms raised. Ultimatum limit is at 6:00 am November 10, 1945.
Ultimatum 10 November 1945
After the killing of Brigadier General Mallaby, his successor, Major General Mansergh issued an ultimatum stating that all the leaders and the people of Indonesia are armed to report and put the gun in a specified place and surrendered with arms raised. Ultimatum limit is at 6:00 am November 10, 1945.
The ultimatum was then regarded as an insult to the fighters and the people who have formed many agencies struggle / militia. The ultimatum was rejected by the Indonesian side of the Republic of Indonesia on the grounds that it was already established, and the People's Security Army (TKR) has also been established as the state forces. In addition, many organizations have formed armed struggle of society, including among the youth, students and students who oppose the re-entry of the Dutch government that ride with the presence of British troops in Indonesia.
On November 10 morning, the British army began a large-scale attack, which begins with aerial bombing government buildings to Surabaya, and then deployed about 30,000 infantry, a number of aircraft, tanks and warships.
On November 10 morning, the British army began a large-scale attack, which begins with aerial bombing government buildings to Surabaya, and then deployed about 30,000 infantry, a number of aircraft, tanks and warships.
Various parts of the city of Surabaya bombarded and shot with a cannon from the sea and land. Resistance forces and militias Indonesia then raged across the city, with the active support of the population. The involvement of the population in this battle resulted in thousands of civilians fall victim in the attack, both died mupun injured.
Unexpectedly the British who suspect that the resistance in Surabaya can be conquered within three days, the young pioneers of public figures such as Bung Tomo is a big influence in the community continues to drive the spirit of resistance youths Surabaya so that the resistance continues in the midst of a large-scale attack Britain. Religious leaders consisting of scholars and clerics among clerics cottage Java-like KH. Hasyim Ashari, KH. Wahab Hasbullah and
Unexpectedly the British who suspect that the resistance in Surabaya can be conquered within three days, the young pioneers of public figures such as Bung Tomo is a big influence in the community continues to drive the spirit of resistance youths Surabaya so that the resistance continues in the midst of a large-scale attack Britain. Religious leaders consisting of scholars and clerics among clerics cottage Java-like KH. Hasyim Ashari, KH. Wahab Hasbullah and
pesantren
leaders were also exert their students and civil society as a militia
resistance (at that time the community is not so obedient to the
government but they are more docile and obedient to the clerics) shingga
Indonesia longstanding opposition parties, from day to day, until the other from week to week. Popular resistance initially spontaneous and uncoordinated, increasingly regular. This large-scale battle reaches up to three weeks, before the whole
city of Surabaya eventually fall in the hands of the British.At least 6,000 fighters from Indonesia were killed and 200,000 civilians displaced from Surabaya. [2]. Victims
of British and Indian troops approx number 600. The bloody fighting in
Surabaya, which takes thousands of lives have been moving people's
resistance throughout Indonesia to repel the invaders and defend
freedom. The
number of fighters who died and civilians who are victims on 10th day
of November later remembered as Heroes Day by the Republic of Indonesia
until now.
The killing of Brigadier General Mallaby
Once agreed Truce (truce) dated October 30, 1945, the civil and military leadership of Indonesia, as well as British military leaders together around town with a motorcade, to disseminate the agreement. British defense post of 8, 6 of which are no problems, only in two places, namely in Building and Building Internatio Lindeteves extant problems / shootouts.
Having successfully overcome the difficulties in building Lindeteves, Indonesia-UK group immediately headed Internatio Building, the last British defense post is problematic. When the group arrived at the site, it appears that the building was surrounded by hundreds of youths. After crossing the Red Bridge, seven vehicles entered the area and stopped in front of the building. Indonesian leaders immediately outside the vehicle and shouted to the masses, in order to stop the shoot-out
Once agreed Truce (truce) dated October 30, 1945, the civil and military leadership of Indonesia, as well as British military leaders together around town with a motorcade, to disseminate the agreement. British defense post of 8, 6 of which are no problems, only in two places, namely in Building and Building Internatio Lindeteves extant problems / shootouts.
Having successfully overcome the difficulties in building Lindeteves, Indonesia-UK group immediately headed Internatio Building, the last British defense post is problematic. When the group arrived at the site, it appears that the building was surrounded by hundreds of youths. After crossing the Red Bridge, seven vehicles entered the area and stopped in front of the building. Indonesian leaders immediately outside the vehicle and shouted to the masses, in order to stop the shoot-out
Captain Shaw, Mohammad Mangundiprojo and T.D. Kundan commissioned into the building to convey to the British soldiers who survived in the building, the result of negotiations between the UK and Indonesia. Mallaby was in the car parked in front of the Internatio. Moments after entering the group, looks TD Kundan rushed out of the building, and shortly thereafter, shots were heard from the direction of the building. This shot directly returned by the Indonesian side. Gunfight lasted about two hours. After the shoot-out can be stopped, looked devastated and Mallaby Mallaby car itself was found to have been killed.
There are two events on October 30, 1945, at which time it is cast by the British to the Indonesian side, as being in charge, and then used as an excuse Mansergh to "punish extremists" by issuing
There are two events on October 30, 1945, at which time it is cast by the British to the Indonesian side, as being in charge, and then used as an excuse Mansergh to "punish extremists" by issuing
ultimatum of November 9, 1945:
1. People Indonesia started shooting, and thus has violated the ceasefire (Truce),
2. People Indonesia killed Brigadier Mallaby.
Mallaby deaths is very controversial, but about who started the shooting, later quite clear. Testimony is actually coming from the UK. It is based on statements of several British officers were given to some parties.
The most interesting is delivered to Tom Driberg, a Member of the British Parliament from the Labour Party (Labour). On February 20, 1946, in the debate in Parliament (House of Commons) Tom Driberg, delivering:
1. People Indonesia started shooting, and thus has violated the ceasefire (Truce),
2. People Indonesia killed Brigadier Mallaby.
Mallaby deaths is very controversial, but about who started the shooting, later quite clear. Testimony is actually coming from the UK. It is based on statements of several British officers were given to some parties.
The most interesting is delivered to Tom Driberg, a Member of the British Parliament from the Labour Party (Labour). On February 20, 1946, in the debate in Parliament (House of Commons) Tom Driberg, delivering:
“…..
some of the press reports from Indonesia have been entirely responsible. In
particular, I have learned from officers who have recently returned that some
of the stories which have been told, not only in the newspaper, but, I am sorry
to say, from the Government Front Bench in his House, have been very far from
accurate and have innecessarily imparted prejudice and concerns the lamented
death of Brigadier Mallaby. That was announced to us as a foul murder, and we
accepted it as such. I have learned from officers who were present when it
happened the exact details and it is perfectly clear that Brigadier Mallaby was
not murdered but was honourably killed in action……. The incident was somewhat
confused –as such incidents are- but it took place in and near Union Square in
Surabaya. There had been discussions about a truce earlier in the day. A large crowd
of Indonesians –a mob if you like- had gathered in the square and were in a
rather excited state.
About 20 Indians, in a building on the other side of the square, had been cut off from telephonic communication and did not know about the truce. They were firing sporadically on the mob. Brigadier Mallaby came out from the discussions, walked straight into the crowd, with great courage, and shouted to the Indians to cease fire. They obeyed him. Possibly half an hour later, the mob in the square became turbulent again. Brigadier Mallaby, at a certain point in the proceedings, ordered the Indians to open fire again. They opened fire with two Bren Guns and the mob dispersed and went to cover; then fighting broke out again in good earnest. It is apparent that when Brigadier Mallaby gave the order to open fire again, the truce was in fact broken, at any rate locally. Twenty minutes to half an hour after that, he was unfortunately killed in his car –although it is not absolutely certain whether he was killed by Indonesians who were approaching his car; which exploded simultaneously with the attack on him.
I do not think this amounts to charge of foul murder …..because my information came absolutely at first hand from a British officer who was actually on the spot at the moment, whose bona fides I have no reason to question…..”
About 20 Indians, in a building on the other side of the square, had been cut off from telephonic communication and did not know about the truce. They were firing sporadically on the mob. Brigadier Mallaby came out from the discussions, walked straight into the crowd, with great courage, and shouted to the Indians to cease fire. They obeyed him. Possibly half an hour later, the mob in the square became turbulent again. Brigadier Mallaby, at a certain point in the proceedings, ordered the Indians to open fire again. They opened fire with two Bren Guns and the mob dispersed and went to cover; then fighting broke out again in good earnest. It is apparent that when Brigadier Mallaby gave the order to open fire again, the truce was in fact broken, at any rate locally. Twenty minutes to half an hour after that, he was unfortunately killed in his car –although it is not absolutely certain whether he was killed by Indonesians who were approaching his car; which exploded simultaneously with the attack on him.
I do not think this amounts to charge of foul murder …..because my information came absolutely at first hand from a British officer who was actually on the spot at the moment, whose bona fides I have no reason to question…..”
Here Tom Driberg doubt, that Mallaby killed by the Indonesian people. He stated:
"... .it Is not absolutely Certain Whether he was killed by indonesians who were approaching his car; the which exploded simultaneously with the attack on him. "
Furthermore, he also denied that the deaths Mallaby result "sly killed" (FOULLY Murdered). It seems the leadership of the British army -to generate / reinforce a sense of antipathy against Indonesia- willing to degrade the death of a high-ranking officer to be "killed cunning" than declared "killed in action" in pertempuran- -tewas the honor for every soldier.
"... .it Is not absolutely Certain Whether he was killed by indonesians who were approaching his car; the which exploded simultaneously with the attack on him. "
Furthermore, he also denied that the deaths Mallaby result "sly killed" (FOULLY Murdered). It seems the leadership of the British army -to generate / reinforce a sense of antipathy against Indonesia- willing to degrade the death of a high-ranking officer to be "killed cunning" than declared "killed in action" in pertempuran- -tewas the honor for every soldier.
Also narrative K. Venu Gopal, at that time held the rank of Major, who is Commander D Company, 6th Battalion, Mahratta. Company D is taking place in the House Internatio defense. Dated August 8, 1974, he wrote to J.G.A. Parrot, among others:
“Let me first give you some background. “D” Coy had been under fire off and on and had already casualties. The firing came from other buildings on the square and by and large we were able to contain it. We could, however, see that armed men barred all the exits from the square.
Meanwhile armed Indonesians swarmed over to the veranda of the building and I had to bluntly tell them that I would fire if they started pressing into the building. By this time I could not see Brigade Mallaby or the LOs (Liaison Officers) because of the crowds on the veranda.
Just then Capt. Shaw and Kundan ( I did not know their names at that time) tried to get into the building but were prevented. Kundan then shouted to the crowd that he would get us surrender and he and Capt.Shaw were then allowed to go into the building if they took an Indonesian officer with them. I allowed them in hoping to play for time. After a little time Kundan went out of the building, leaving Capt. Shaw and the Indonesian Officer behind.
Soon thereafter the armed men started pushing in and I was left with no option but to open fire. The Decision was mine and mine alone. Capt. Smith is correct when he says that BM (Mallaby-pen.) did not give any orders to Capt. Shaw..”
With the recognition Mayor Gopal, commander of Company D which survive in Internatio Building, now proven, that the starting shot is the British; but it looks like he still wants to protect the former boss to underline, that the firing command is his own decision. This is clearly contrary to the testimony T.D. Kundan, which is reinforced by the testimony of a British officer by Tom Driberg.
With this recognition is clear, that the British at that time twist the facts and alleged that the ceasefire has been violated Indonesian side (the Truce roomates had been broken). In the tense situation an explosion or fire will cause panic in groups that still covered the atmosphere of combat, so that the shot immediately returned; the battle around the
With this recognition is clear, that the British at that time twist the facts and alleged that the ceasefire has been violated Indonesian side (the Truce roomates had been broken). In the tense situation an explosion or fire will cause panic in groups that still covered the atmosphere of combat, so that the shot immediately returned; the battle around the
From the recognition of both the British officers have clear, that trigger the shoot-out was the British themselves. This allegation is actually right, when listened Mallaby way of thinking, as written by Capt. Smith:
“…He (Mallaby, red.) did not believe
in the safe-conducts in so far as it applied to us, but thought that some at
least of the Company might get away. Accordingly Capt. Shaw was sent into the
building to give the necessary orders…..”
Sebelum itu, menurut Smith, telah
terjadi perbedaan pendapat antara Kapten Shaw dan Mallaby mengenai
permintaan para pemuda Indonesia, agar tentara Inggris meninggalkan
persenjataan mereka di dalam gedung. Awalnya, Kapten Shaw menyetujui permintaan
ini, tetapi Mallaby kemudian membatalkannya. Smith :
“…Eventually, the mob demanded that the troops in the building laid (sic) down their arms and marched (sic) out: they and us (sic) guaranteed a safeconduct back to the air field. The Brigadier flatly refused to consider this proposal. After further pressure, however, Capt.Shaw, who was well known to some of the indonesians through his job as FSO, and who had been a considerable strain since our arrival in Surabaya, agreed to the terms on his own responsibility. The Brigadier at once countemanded this………”
“…Eventually, the mob demanded that the troops in the building laid (sic) down their arms and marched (sic) out: they and us (sic) guaranteed a safeconduct back to the air field. The Brigadier flatly refused to consider this proposal. After further pressure, however, Capt.Shaw, who was well known to some of the indonesians through his job as FSO, and who had been a considerable strain since our arrival in Surabaya, agreed to the terms on his own responsibility. The Brigadier at once countemanded this………”
Tom Driberg description in the British Parliament (House of Commons) looks statement obtained from Captain Shaw.
Then the second charge, that the Indonesian people "falsely kill Mallaby", need to be investigated further. On the Indonesian side many people claimed that it was he who shot Mallaby. Hj. Lukitaningsih I. Rajamin-Supandhan noted, there are about 12 people who claimed to be the shooting Mallaby. However, in the judgment of some of the agents of history, of some of the information given, the true story is most likely delivered by Abdul Azis. (See: Barlan Setiadijaya, 10 November 1945 ...., Pp. 429-435.) Dul Arnowo noted the report of an eyewitness, Ali Harun, which is then forwarded to President Sukarno. The letter was brought by Colonel dr. W. Hutagalung to Jakarta, and delivered directly to the President Sukarno on 8 November 1945.
Then the second charge, that the Indonesian people "falsely kill Mallaby", need to be investigated further. On the Indonesian side many people claimed that it was he who shot Mallaby. Hj. Lukitaningsih I. Rajamin-Supandhan noted, there are about 12 people who claimed to be the shooting Mallaby. However, in the judgment of some of the agents of history, of some of the information given, the true story is most likely delivered by Abdul Azis. (See: Barlan Setiadijaya, 10 November 1945 ...., Pp. 429-435.) Dul Arnowo noted the report of an eyewitness, Ali Harun, which is then forwarded to President Sukarno. The letter was brought by Colonel dr. W. Hutagalung to Jakarta, and delivered directly to the President Sukarno on 8 November 1945.
From various accounts, these were true shooting with a gun by a young Indonesian man toward Mallaby, but no one can be sure, that Mallaby was killed by the gunfire. What is interesting to observe is the recognition of Captain RC Smith of Battalion 6, Mahratta Regiment, which at that time served as the Brigade Liaison Officer 49. On 31 October, he gave the first report, and then in February, in connection with the description of Tom Driberg in the House of Commons. Smith reports published by J.G.A. Parrot, in his analysis, Who Killed Brigadier Mallaby? Captain R.C. Smith writes:
“The Report by Capt. R.C. Smith.
At approximately 1230 hrs. on 30th
October, Capt T.L. Laughland and I were ordered by Col. L.H.O.Pugh, DSO, 2i/c
(Second in Command) of the Bde., to proceed to the Government offices, where we
were each to collect an Indonesian representative. From there one of us was to
go north, and the other south, through the town, and try to persuade the mobs
to go back to their barracks. Brigadier Mallaby was at this time in conference
with the Governor in the Government Offices.
On arrival there, we were told by the Brigadier that the Indonesians had refused to treat with anyone except him. Accordingly we set off with the Brigadier and the FSO (Field Security Officer), Capt. Shaw, plus the leaders of the various parties, in several cars, the foremost of which was flying the white flag.
The first place to which we went was a large building about 150 yards west of the Kali Mas River, which runs north and south through the town. One Coy of the 6 Mahrattas had been having a very stiff fight in this building against about five hundred Indonesians, and had been in considerable difficulties.
On our arrival there, the mob was collected round the cars, and the various party leaders made speeches to them, in an attempt to persuade them to return to their barracks. The speeches were at first quite well received, and the necessary promises given.
We then got into our cars and set off for the next position. We had only gone about 100 yards when we were stopped by the mob aproximately 20 yards from the Kali Mas. From then on the situation rapidly deteriorated. The mob leaders began to incite the mob, and the party leaders gradually lost control. The mob, which up to that time had seemed fairly friendly towards us, became distinctly menacing: swords were waved, and pistols pointed at us and we were left with very little doubt as to their intentions.
Eventually, the mob demanded that the troops in the building laid (sic) down their arms and marched (sic) out: they and us (sic) guaranteed a safe-conduct back to the air field. The Brigadier flatly refused to consider this proposal. After further pressure, however, Capt.Shaw, who was well known to some of the indonesians through his job as FSO, and who had been under a considerable strain since our arrival in Surabaya, agreed to the terms on his own responsibility. The Brigadier at once countemanded this: on further consideration, he decided that the company had been in so bad a position before, that any further fighting would lead to their being wiped out.
He did not believe in the safe-conduct in so far as it applied to us, but thought that some at least of the company might get away. Accordingly Capt. Shaw was sent into the building to give the necessary orders.
The rest of us were disarmed – except for a grenade which Capt. Laughland managed to keep concealed – and made to sit in one of the cars.
The Brigadier was on the side nearest to the Kali Mas, Capt. Laughland in the middle, and myself on the outside nearest to the building in which our troops were.
When Capt. Shaw got into the building, the Indonesians brought up a machine gun to cover the entrance. He and the company commander decided that any attempt to walk out unarmed would lead to a massacre and so the order to open fire was given.
As soon as the firing started, the three of us who were in the car crouched down on the floor as far as possible. An Indonesian came up to the Brigadier’s window with a rifle. He fired four shots at three of us, all of which missed. He went away while we shammed dead. The battle went on for about two and a half hours, to about 2030 hrs, by which time it was dark. At the end of that time, the firing died down to some extent, and we could hear shouting as though the Indonesians were being collected. Two of them came up to the car and attempted to drive it away. That failed and one of them opened the back door on the Brigadier’s side. The Brigadier moved, and as they saw from that, that he was still alive, he spoke to them and asked to be taken to one of the party leaders. The two Indonesians went away to discuss this, and one of them came back to the front door on the Brigadier’s side. The Brigadier spoke to him again, the Indonesian answered, and then suddenly reached his hand in through the front window, and shot the Brigadier. It took from fifteen seconds to half-a-minute for the Brigadier to die, but from the noise he made at the end, there was absolutely no doubt that he was dead. (Notes from Parrot: This was the first time that these details of the final moments of Brigadier Mallaby had been made public. In this second report Smith offered the following explanation:”In the report made by Capt.Laughland and myself the following morning we stated that the Brigadier was killed instantly. This was done in order to spare the feelings of the family.”)
As soon as he had fired, the Indonesian ducked down beside the car, and remained there until after the Brigadier was dead. I took the pin out of the grenade which Capt.Laughland had previously passed to me, and waited. The Indonesian appeared again, and fired another shot which grazed Capt. Laughland’s shoulder. I let go the lever of the grenade, held it for two seconds to make sure it was not returned and threw it out of the open door by Brigadier’s body. As soon as it had exploded, Capt. Laughland and I went out of the door on my side of the car, waited for a short time, then ran around the car and dived into the Kali Mas. As the two Indonesians by the side of the car did not attemp to interfere with us it is presumed that they were killed by the grenade—which also set the back seat of the car on fire. After five hours in the Kali Mas, we managed to reach our troops in the Dock area.”
Smith's description a.l. strengthen Gopal explanation, that it is true the British who started the shooting. Smith's testimony is similar to the description of Abdul Aziz; and it turns out he was not dead as alleged Smith.On arrival there, we were told by the Brigadier that the Indonesians had refused to treat with anyone except him. Accordingly we set off with the Brigadier and the FSO (Field Security Officer), Capt. Shaw, plus the leaders of the various parties, in several cars, the foremost of which was flying the white flag.
The first place to which we went was a large building about 150 yards west of the Kali Mas River, which runs north and south through the town. One Coy of the 6 Mahrattas had been having a very stiff fight in this building against about five hundred Indonesians, and had been in considerable difficulties.
On our arrival there, the mob was collected round the cars, and the various party leaders made speeches to them, in an attempt to persuade them to return to their barracks. The speeches were at first quite well received, and the necessary promises given.
We then got into our cars and set off for the next position. We had only gone about 100 yards when we were stopped by the mob aproximately 20 yards from the Kali Mas. From then on the situation rapidly deteriorated. The mob leaders began to incite the mob, and the party leaders gradually lost control. The mob, which up to that time had seemed fairly friendly towards us, became distinctly menacing: swords were waved, and pistols pointed at us and we were left with very little doubt as to their intentions.
Eventually, the mob demanded that the troops in the building laid (sic) down their arms and marched (sic) out: they and us (sic) guaranteed a safe-conduct back to the air field. The Brigadier flatly refused to consider this proposal. After further pressure, however, Capt.Shaw, who was well known to some of the indonesians through his job as FSO, and who had been under a considerable strain since our arrival in Surabaya, agreed to the terms on his own responsibility. The Brigadier at once countemanded this: on further consideration, he decided that the company had been in so bad a position before, that any further fighting would lead to their being wiped out.
He did not believe in the safe-conduct in so far as it applied to us, but thought that some at least of the company might get away. Accordingly Capt. Shaw was sent into the building to give the necessary orders.
The rest of us were disarmed – except for a grenade which Capt. Laughland managed to keep concealed – and made to sit in one of the cars.
The Brigadier was on the side nearest to the Kali Mas, Capt. Laughland in the middle, and myself on the outside nearest to the building in which our troops were.
When Capt. Shaw got into the building, the Indonesians brought up a machine gun to cover the entrance. He and the company commander decided that any attempt to walk out unarmed would lead to a massacre and so the order to open fire was given.
As soon as the firing started, the three of us who were in the car crouched down on the floor as far as possible. An Indonesian came up to the Brigadier’s window with a rifle. He fired four shots at three of us, all of which missed. He went away while we shammed dead. The battle went on for about two and a half hours, to about 2030 hrs, by which time it was dark. At the end of that time, the firing died down to some extent, and we could hear shouting as though the Indonesians were being collected. Two of them came up to the car and attempted to drive it away. That failed and one of them opened the back door on the Brigadier’s side. The Brigadier moved, and as they saw from that, that he was still alive, he spoke to them and asked to be taken to one of the party leaders. The two Indonesians went away to discuss this, and one of them came back to the front door on the Brigadier’s side. The Brigadier spoke to him again, the Indonesian answered, and then suddenly reached his hand in through the front window, and shot the Brigadier. It took from fifteen seconds to half-a-minute for the Brigadier to die, but from the noise he made at the end, there was absolutely no doubt that he was dead. (Notes from Parrot: This was the first time that these details of the final moments of Brigadier Mallaby had been made public. In this second report Smith offered the following explanation:”In the report made by Capt.Laughland and myself the following morning we stated that the Brigadier was killed instantly. This was done in order to spare the feelings of the family.”)
As soon as he had fired, the Indonesian ducked down beside the car, and remained there until after the Brigadier was dead. I took the pin out of the grenade which Capt.Laughland had previously passed to me, and waited. The Indonesian appeared again, and fired another shot which grazed Capt. Laughland’s shoulder. I let go the lever of the grenade, held it for two seconds to make sure it was not returned and threw it out of the open door by Brigadier’s body. As soon as it had exploded, Capt. Laughland and I went out of the door on my side of the car, waited for a short time, then ran around the car and dived into the Kali Mas. As the two Indonesians by the side of the car did not attemp to interfere with us it is presumed that they were killed by the grenade—which also set the back seat of the car on fire. After five hours in the Kali Mas, we managed to reach our troops in the Dock area.”
In connection with the shotgun shooting that occurred prior to the shooting of Mallaby, in a letter to Parrot dated November 23, 1973, Smith wrote, among others:
“I
have no idea what hapenned to the four shots from the rifleman. He approached
the car from the left (the Brigadiers side) with the rifle at the ready, and
looking at the three of us. I am not ashamed to say at this point I shut my
eyes and started counting the shots!
I think all three of us were equally surprised at finding both ourselves and the others alive afterwards!”Certainly very remarkable, that the shooting of three people who were sitting in the car narrow with four shots, but none of them were hit. This shows, that can be ascertained, the owner of the gun for the first time to shoot, so shoot three people with the highest possible distance of 2 meters, missed all four shots.
Regarding the characteristics of shooter Mallaby, in a letter to Parrot dated February 20, 1974, Smith wrote:
I think all three of us were equally surprised at finding both ourselves and the others alive afterwards!”Certainly very remarkable, that the shooting of three people who were sitting in the car narrow with four shots, but none of them were hit. This shows, that can be ascertained, the owner of the gun for the first time to shoot, so shoot three people with the highest possible distance of 2 meters, missed all four shots.
Regarding the characteristics of shooter Mallaby, in a letter to Parrot dated February 20, 1974, Smith wrote:
“… the indonesian who killed the
Brigadier was a young lad around 16 or 17 approximately, but it was too dark to
see whether he was wearing any sort of uniform. The weapon was an automatic
pistol …”
Kemudian pada 20 Februari 1974,
Smith menulis kepada Parrot yang isinya antara lain:
“I have no recollection of the conversation that the Indian interpreter reported and while I certainly could not state that I heard everything that happenned, I think I should have remembered this, if not now after 30 years, certainly at the time when I wrote my report. However, in all fairness, I must say that there were moments when my attention was distracted from the Brigadier myself. For instance, I can remember spending some time trying to convince a very angry young Indonesian that I had not personally be responsible for his brother’s death.
Going back to my report, the position of all of us was very closely gouped around one car so that there was only a matter of a very few feet between us. Therefore, Brigadier Mallaby was certainly able to hear when Captain Shaw agreed to the demands of the mob, which was why he was able to countermand it immediately. As I said, he then changed his mind in the hope that some of the men at least might reach safety, but the orders that he gave Captain Shaw were that the troops in the building should lay down their arms and come out unarmed, in the hope of safe-conduct.
I definitely did not hear any suggestion that they should be ordered to open fire after a certain length of time had elapsed. The one thing that has always been quite firmly established in my memory is that the orders to fire were given by Captain Shaw once he had got into the building.”
“I have no recollection of the conversation that the Indian interpreter reported and while I certainly could not state that I heard everything that happenned, I think I should have remembered this, if not now after 30 years, certainly at the time when I wrote my report. However, in all fairness, I must say that there were moments when my attention was distracted from the Brigadier myself. For instance, I can remember spending some time trying to convince a very angry young Indonesian that I had not personally be responsible for his brother’s death.
Going back to my report, the position of all of us was very closely gouped around one car so that there was only a matter of a very few feet between us. Therefore, Brigadier Mallaby was certainly able to hear when Captain Shaw agreed to the demands of the mob, which was why he was able to countermand it immediately. As I said, he then changed his mind in the hope that some of the men at least might reach safety, but the orders that he gave Captain Shaw were that the troops in the building should lay down their arms and come out unarmed, in the hope of safe-conduct.
I definitely did not hear any suggestion that they should be ordered to open fire after a certain length of time had elapsed. The one thing that has always been quite firmly established in my memory is that the orders to fire were given by Captain Shaw once he had got into the building.”
The doubt here is alleged Smith, that Mallaby was killed as a result of gunshot Indonesian youth. As in his writings, he said that at the time at around 20:30 and darkness. Indeed, the flow of electricity in the area has been decided by the Indonesian side. He just said:"... Based on sound is heard from the direction Mallaby, he is
convinced that Mallaby had killed 15-30 seconds after being shot with a
gun ..."In addition, he also admitted, that the grenades were thrown through
the body Mallaby has resulted in the burning of the back seat of their
car, meaning Mallaby place to sit.According to the examination at the hospital, the bodies Mallaby very difficult to recognize, because the charred and ruined. He identified through markings watches in his arms, as Mallaby known for his habit of wearing two watches; so instead of identifying a face or other body characteristics. It is delivered by dr. Sugiri, to Colonel dr. W. Hutagalung.
Had
Smith correct information, that Mallaby does not give the command to
start shooting, even opposite, namely Shaw instructed the captain to
command the British soldiers in the building in order to lay down their
arms and out of the building without weapons, then there has been a
fatal defiance, the command of company commander, Major Gopal, to start shooting. Viewed from any angle, the incidence of gunfire that resulted in the death of Mallaby, is the fault of British troops.Regarding the allegation that Mallaby killed by gunshot, very doubtful. Obviously
to defend himself, Smith and Laughland must declare in advance that
Mallaby had been killed when Smith threw a grenade, which was then just
burn the back of their car and Mallaby riding. Several
witnesses on the part of Indonesia said that the car exploded as a
result of the grenade Mallaby and thus, arguably Mallaby was killed by
mistake the British themselves. From the chronology of events can be inferred, that Mallaby was killed because the shelling flared again.Which
is very interesting to observe in connection with the grenade attacks
by Captain Smith, is testimony Trisnaningprojo Imam Sutrisno, a young
army captain, a former member of PETA. Trisnaningprojo participate in the motorcade in order to disseminate the results of the agreement Sukarno-Hawthorn. That
Smith was the one who threw the grenade that resulted in the burning
car carrying Mallaby, recognized by Smith himself, but Trisnaningprodjo
said that Smith had not been in the car with Mallaby, but together
Laughland outside the car when shots were fired against Mallaby. Trisnaningprojo
see, Smith is near the building and threw a grenade in the direction of
the young man who shot Mallaby, but the grenade exploded next to a car
Mallaby the rear door open. So, Captain Smith did not throw a grenade from the car, but from outside the car. This
means that no one knows Mallaby condition after the shooting of the
youth Indonesia, whether injured or indeed killed as narrative Smith.
Neither
of the testimony of Smith, as well as statements that include sketches
Trisnaningprojo location at the time of the incident, the youth
Indonesia shooting with a gun in the direction of Mallaby through the
front window on the left side of the car, while Mallaby -still according
to Smith sat in the back seat, on the far left side. From
the position of Indonesian youth, although he uses his left hand, most
likely body parts Mallaby right that will hit, and this is usually not
lethal. Different, if the affected body part is left, in the heart.In
addition, also no one can be sure, that the boy shot right on target as
previously -also according to Smith when the three of us are still
sitting in the back of the car, there is shooting at them with guns four
times, but none of the bullets whatever about them. There is a possibility, that the young man with a pistol shot, also
the first time holding a gun, so it has not been adept at using.When
interviewed by Ben Anderson on August 13, 1962, Dul Arnowo stated that
he believes Mallaby inadvertently, had been killed by his own men.In a confidential report to his superior, Colonel Laurens van der Post former British Military Governor in Batavia / Jakarta in 1945, wrote (Sir Laurens van der Post, The Admiral's Baby, John Murray, London, 1996):
"The details of what happenned at Sourabaya is not really relevant to this review but it is interresting that the very latest evidence that the Mallaby Suggests Murder, far from being premiditatet or a deliberate breach of faith, was the caused more by the indescribable confusion and nervousness excitement of everyone in the town. Had General Hawthorn, the General Officer Commanding Java at the same time, had proper Civil Affairs and political officers on his staff to draft his unfortunate proclamations for him and to keep [in] continuous and informed contact with population, the story of Sourabaya may well have been different.
"The details of what happenned at Sourabaya is not really relevant to this review but it is interresting that the very latest evidence that the Mallaby Suggests Murder, far from being premiditatet or a deliberate breach of faith, was the caused more by the indescribable confusion and nervousness excitement of everyone in the town. Had General Hawthorn, the General Officer Commanding Java at the same time, had proper Civil Affairs and political officers on his staff to draft his unfortunate proclamations for him and to keep [in] continuous and informed contact with population, the story of Sourabaya may well have been different.
